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Abstract: The tax gap between taxes that are “actually”
paid and taxes that “ought” to have been paid by multina-
tional corporate entities has become an area of huge pub-
lic policy concern in the recent decades. This study reviews
the impact of new legislation to reveal the tax gap created
by the EU banks and financial institutions passed in 2013
and in particular of the quality of the resulting country-by-
country reporting (CBCR) requirement for banks. Although
resulting tax gap estimates are noted, they suffer due to
significant problems in the published data; much of it is
due to the quality of the regulation requiring its publica-
tion and implementation. The findings reveal a lack of un-
derstanding of the technical and structural weaknesses of
accounting in a transnational context in the design of this
regulation. CBCR is destined to fail in achieving its regula-
tory objectives in this context unless necessary reform of
the regulation is undertaken.
Keywords: Tax gaps; Tax avoidance; Accounting; Policy-
making; Country-by-country reporting; CRD IV
1 Introduction
In 2013, the European Union included a requirement that
the EU-based banks publish a limited form of country-by-
country reporting (CBCR) in the revised Capital Require-
ments Directive IV (CRD IV) [15]. As noted in this article,
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the objective was to “allow stakeholders to gain a better
understanding of the structures of financial groups, their
activities, and geographical presence and help to under-
stand whether taxes are being paid where the actual busi-
ness activity takes place” [18]. The initial objective of the re-
search that underpins this article was to test whether this
objective could be fulfilled by checking whether reliable
estimates of profit misallocation by the reporting banks
could be prepared based on the data they published. The
objective appeared reasonable, given the stated objective
of CRD IV in this regard. In practice, this research objec-
tive could not be fulfilled as planned: the data published
as a result of the CRD IV requirements could not support
that objective. This article explores how and why this hap-
pened, and what can be done about it.
Global corporations, and their growth in power and
dominance, have raised increasing concerns among aca-
demic researchers [2, 25] and a whole field of corporate
governance research has emerged in the past two decades
[32, see, e.g.]. This research suggests that in their efforts
to externalize costs, firms have been determined to reduce
taxes, seeing taxation as a major burden and cost to the
business, rather than an opportunity to repay states for vi-
tal infrastructure services and legal protections [2, 6, 56].
In a similar vein, their power has increasingly led to cor-
porate boards seeing regulations of any kind as a cost or a
burden to their profit-making purpose [30], and firms have
actively shopped globally forminimal regulations and con-
straints [51]. This has eroded the tax base of countries and
led to a race to the bottom.
Given the significant rates of corporation taxes
charged on company profits, ranging from 0% to more
than 40% of profits [31], these taxes have been a key target
for minimization. Organizations such as Tax Justice Net-
work [56] andmovements such as OccupyWall Street have
had a significant impact in exposing the significant levels
of corporate tax avoidance through media outlets and by
direct campaigns and public rallies. They have suggested
that income from high-tax jurisdictions is being shifted
to low-tax jurisdictions, making it very difficult for nation
states to collect fair taxes—leading to a major “tax gap”
[47]. As a result, transnational regulatory organizations
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have been pressurized to respond. Under instruction from
the G20 and G8, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) took charge of the initiative
to tackle global tax avoidance, through the base erosion
and profit-shifting (BEPS) initiative [9, 39, 40]. The pri-
mary purpose of this exercise was to identify the levels
of such tax avoidance and the locations used to pursue it
and to use the resulting transparency to encourage local
tax authorities to effectively police and recover taxes that
should legitimately fall due within their jurisdictions.
Among the measures adopted as a part of the BEPS
process was a form of CBCR [40]. This was explicitly de-
rived from recommendations made by civil society groups
[33, 37]. In this context, it is important to note that CBCR
is based on accounting and not tax data [37]. The purpose
of CBCR is to indicate whether the risk of BEPS exists and
not to, in itself, be the basis for taxation assessment. That
said, there is now a growing awareness that accounting
data based onmost existing accounting standards, includ-
ing those issued by the International Financial Reporting
Standard Foundation that are used by most multinational
corporations, are not suitable for the appraisal of many
taxation issues [53]. This is partly by design: the Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standard foundation states
that they are not intended for this purpose [26, para 1.10].
This might explain why every country adjusts accounting
numbers when determining tax charges [53]. The issue is
compounded by the fact that accounting rules and prac-
tices also vary internationally and that even where there
are international standards, their interpretation is often
variable, making the implementation and enforcement of
tax rules, technically very complex and difficult to enforce
[48, 53]. The consequence is that there are very serious and
frequently intractable technical problems in determining
what a fair taxation liability for a multinational corpora-
tion might be, and how this can be apportioned among
states in an equitable manner. As a result Sikka and Mur-
phy [53] proposed a whole new conceptual framework for
tax accounting, something that has never been attempted
before. In the current and likely continuing absence of
the adoption of such a standard, there are serious prob-
lems for the enforcement of tax rules, given the power
and resources of these giant corporations and the lack of
any global tax monitoring authority. The chance of CBCR
succeeding has, then, to be appraised within this context.
CBCR combines financial reporting with a tax methodol-
ogy in an attempt to identify the consequences of BEPS.
What it cannot do is overcome the inherent deficits in the
accounting of a multinational corporation if that account-
ing data are in itself not fit for tax reporting purposes. Al-
though similar point has been made elsewhere [e.g. 19],
our additional contribution is in using specific data from
reports published by banks for the period 2013–2017. This
research shows how these deficits were ignored in the pol-
icy design stage, leading to a significantly detrimental out-
come from a regulatory and enforcement perspective.
In the light of these various concerns, this article ad-
dresses two issues and then outlines the research method
adopted. The first is the development of CBCR and the mo-
tivations for it, including the appraisal of tax gaps. Next, it
considers the motivation for the adoption of CBCR by reg-
ulatory authorities, concentrating in particular on the use
made of it by the European Union to appraise the tax af-
fairs of banks. The research method and objectives for the
third and final part are then outlined. The findings from
the research reveal significant problems with the new dis-
closures and their accuracy and reliability. The quality of
the data published as a result of the EU regulation and the
failings within it are considered before; lastly, conclusions
are drawn on the apparent failure of this process to date.
2 About country-by-country
reporting—origins and purpose
The perception of a rising global tax gap between the cor-
porate tax that should have been collected and tax that
was actually paid, and evidence that developing countries
are adversely impacted by the aggressive behavior ofmulti-
national corporations, led to calls for CBCR [33–35]. A form
of CBCR was proposed by the United Nations in the 1970s
but fell by the wayside under pressure from the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development [12, 59].
The idea was independently revived in a new form in 2003
as a means of revealing the financial performance of a
multinational corporation in each country in which it op-
erated, something which was not then (or now) reported
in the annual financial statements of those corporations
[33, 36]. This most elementary form of accountability was
strongly resisted by accounting standards setters [58].
It was hoped that this transparency of information
would lead to better knowledge and empowerment for lo-
cal tax authorities, especially in developing countries, to
collect taxes thatwere rightly due to them [36]. Accounting
was seen in this context as a tool for better tax enforcement
and regulation despite the general problem with trans-
parency regimes in achieving behavioral change [21]. One
of the first global initiatives to require such transparency
was created by the European Union in 2013 as part of the
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) regulations
that were intended to improve the ability of the European
Unauthentifiziert   | Heruntergeladen  06.01.20 08:52   UTC
BEPS Policy Failure—The Case of EU Country-By-Country Reporting | 3
banks to survive another global financial crisis [15]. Given
the hopes and aspirations for that regulation, the present
study was conducted to analyze the information revealed
and to see whether substantial tax gaps were revealed.
The original intention of the research that underpins
this article was to deliver a measure of the corporation tax
gap estimated based on the reporting of major EU banks
required under Article 89 of the CRD IV of the European
Union that was adopted in June 2013 [15]. The objective of
CRD IVwas to “lay down rules concerning . . . access to the
activity of credit institutions and investment firms [and to
provide] supervisory powers and tools for the prudential
supervision of [these] institutions by competent authori-
ties” [15, Article 1]. In the process of doing so, the European
Union included provision that the regulated institutions
should
disclose annually, specifying, byMember State and by third coun-
try in which it has an establishment, the following information
on a consolidated basis for the financial year (a) name(s), nature
of activities and geographical location; (b) turnover; (c) number
of employees on a full time equivalent basis; (d) profit or loss
before tax; (e) tax on profit or loss; (f) public subsidies received.
[15, Article 89].
Their stated purpose in creating this legislation was to
allow stakeholders to gain a better understanding of the struc-
tures of financial groups, their activities and geographical pres-
ence and help to understand whether taxes are being paid where
the actual business activity takes place. Mandatory country-by-
country reporting is an important element of the corporate re-
sponsibility of institutions towards stakeholders and society and
will help to restore trust in the banking sector.
[18].
In that context, the original objective of this work can be
seen as being consistent with the stated policy objective
for the CRD IV Article 89 disclosures. The rationale stated
by the European Union is based on the transparency and
corporate responsibility, with restoring trust thrown into
the mix, although no mention is made in the legislation
on how this will be monitored and enforced and what the
penalties are for noncompliance with CBCR requirements.
The research objective was then to calculate a “tax
gap” estimate for each country for which reporting was
made based on the principles of unitary taxation. Uni-
tary taxation apportions the total group profit of a multi-
national corporation to jurisdictions based on a formula
[11, 46, 47]. The classic apportionment formula used in uni-
tary taxation is described as the Massachusetts apportion-
ment [11]. This apportions total group profit based on a for-
mula that gives equal weighting to third-party sales, num-
ber of employees, and assets in a location. CBCR was de-
signed to provide the information for this purpose. Propo-
nents of both CBCR and unitary taxation suggest that uni-
tary taxation is a more equitable method of apportioning
the total taxable profits of a multinational corporation to
the locations where it trades than that offered by the arm’s
length pricing methodology OECD [49]. Although the use
of unitary taxationhas not been agreeduponby any global
body, it was felt that CBCR information would both open
the way toward global unitary taxation and achieve a re-
duction of tax avoidance and the tax gap relating to corpo-
ration tax in the meantime. As such there were significant
hopes for this regulation at the time that it was enacted.
Given how recent this data set is, there is hitherto little re-
search on the implications of this new evidence.
3 Questioning reform
motivations—oecd and eu
policy-making “on the hoof”
The global regulation of tax has been a complex arena,
with no central power or authority to codify, enforce, and
punish tax evaders and avoiders [46]. The OECD initiative
onBEPSwas set against this background [39]. The demand
for reform needs to be understood in the context of the pe-
riod. In December 2012, the UK House of Commons Pub-
lic Accounts Committee held public, and humiliating hear-
ings into the tax affairs of Google, Amazon, and Starbucks
[45], whichwerewidely covered in the globalmedia. Prime
Minister Cameron responded to the subsequent public out-
rage in a speech at the World Economic Forum in January
2013 in which he promised action [10]. The response was
the adoption, largely under pressure from the UK develop-
ment NGOs, of a call for CBCR in the communiqué of the
G8 Summit held at Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, in June
2013 [23], although, as was apparent at the time, there was
little real understanding of what this meant [3].
The European Union was also very concerned about
the tax practices ofmultinational corporations. Its original
focus was on tax payments in the extractive industries [58,
p. 1177], and directives requiring limited disclosures on a
CBCR for that sector were passed in June 2013 [16, 17]. On
the same day as these were passed, the European Union
was also considering the revised Capital Requirements Di-
rective (CRD IV) for banks and other financial institutions
and intermediaries. Almost as an afterthought, in great
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haste, and with almost no consultation,1 a limited form of
CBCRwas added to that directive [58]. That those responsi-
ble for the regulation had little apparent understanding of
thedemands that it gave rise to,which is apparent from the
requirement imposed that subsidies from government be
reported by the institutions covered by the Capital Require-
mentsDirective. The requirement todisclose subsidieswas
important in the extractive industries butmakes almost no
sense in banking, where they are almost unknown.2 There
was no guidance in CRD IV on how these requirements
were to be interpreted. This has given rise to significant
problems, as noted later in this article.
There were skeptics of this CBCR and its effectiveness
from the outset. Evers et al. [19] demonstrated that neither
consolidated or individual financial statements nor other
existing data sources seem to be an appropriate basis for
providing such country-specific information. They identi-
fied technical flaws in the quality and reliability of data,
whichwould hamper effective tax policing. They also ques-
tioned the lack of a theoretical foundation in the definition
of CBCR and the benefits of this informationwould not out-
weigh the costs of gathering and monitoring the informa-
tion. Instead, Evers et al. [19] suggested that tax legislators
should limit profit-shifting by enforcing tax rules and clos-
ing gaps in tax law. The evidence now available is that at
least some of their data concerns may have been justified,
and this is discussed below.
Other recent researches have investigated effects of
the implementation of CRD IV on banks. It suggests an in-
crease in taxes paid, a decrease in profit-shifting, and no
change in returns. While recent evidence by Overesch and
Wolff [43] suggested that European multinational banks
increased their tax expenses relative to unaffected other
banks after CBCR became mandatory and Joshi et al. [29]
found a significant decrease in the income-shifting activi-
ties by the financial affiliates in the post-adoption period,
Dutt et al. [14] did not find significant abnormal returns
for the banks affected by the political decision to include
a CBCR obligation. Brown et al. [7] investigated the CBCR
data and found that there is evidence of abnormal rev-
enues and wages in tax havens, something that we would
expect to see inGroups practicing tax avoidance—CBCR ex-
1 One of the authors of this paper, Richard Murphy, was telephoned
by an MEP involved in negotiations the night before this Directive was
passed to ask what should be included in it as the opportunity for
enactment had arisen that day.
2 Richard Murphy recalls asking for this requirement to be replaced
with one requiring disclosure of net assets invested by country, but
was told change was not possible given the timescale involved and
that any disclosure should be accepted as being better than none.
poses the scale and existence of tax havens, information
that was not available before. Fatica and Gregori [20] used
the CRD IV data and found that the bulk of profit-shifting
takes place among subsidiaries, as foreign-to-foreign tax
differences matter significantly more that home-to-foreign
differentials. What is different about the present study is
that it examines in detail the quality of data provided by
CBCR and finds this to be seriously flawed and unreliable
in a variety of ways.
4 Research objectives and method
The aim of the current research was not to test whether
or not each bank for which a report could be located had
profit shifted, or not. It was, instead, to test whether or
not there appears to be systemic evidence of misreport-
ing of tax liabilities by the banks subject to the CRD IV
regime, which the European Union has implied that the
data should make possible [18]. To test this hypothesis, a
data set developed by a team of researchers at the Czech
Republic’s Charles University has been used. These data
collated the Article 89, CRD IV reports published by 46 dif-
ferent banks for a period of 5 years (2013–2017, although
not all published reports for 2013). These data have al-
readybeen reportedon for other purposes [27] and thedata
are publicly available online via Open Knowledge Interna-
tional [42]. This specific data set is similar to some previ-
ously used data sets such as those used by Bouvatier et
al. [8], Fatica and Gregori [20], Oxfam [44] but is larger in
terms of years and banks covered. The banks used for re-
search purposes are listed in Table 1. It will be noted that
some banks from the ranking are not included in the data
set: despite best efforts, their CRD IV data could not be
found on public record despite the fact that it is a legal
requirement that this information be published: it would
appear that they have chosen not to comply.
To test the hypothesis, a form of formula apportion-
ment was applied to the data published by the banks sam-
pled to determine whether their profit reporting appeared
to be consistent with the location of the economic sub-
stance of their activities. If it was consistent, it was pre-
sumed that base erosion and profit-shifting was not taking
place, and vice versa. As, however, the CRD IV Directive
only reports information on some of the variables required
for unitary apportionment based on theMassachusetts for-
mula, a restricted form of unitary apportionment had to be
undertaken. For example, the data published on turnover
are in total, and not for third party sales as would ideally
be required for formula apportionment, and there is no as-
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Table 1: Banks in the data with a ranking according to the largest banks in Europe by total assets in 2017
Banks Ranking Banks Ranking
HSBC Holdings plc 1 ABN AMRO Group NV 26
BNP Paribas SA 2 KBC Group NV 28
Crédit Agricole Group 3 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 29
Deutsche Bank AG 4 DNB ASA 30
Banco Santander SA 5 Nationwide Building Society 31
Barclays Plc 6 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 32
Société Générale SA 7 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 33
Groupe BPCE 8 Swedbank AB 35
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 9 Banco de Sabadell SA 36
ING Groep NV 10 Bankia SA 37
UniCredit SpA 11 Erste Group Bank AG 38
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 12 Bayerische Landesbank 39
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 13 Dexia SA 43
Crédit Mutuel Group 14 Belfius Banque SA 44
UBS Group AG 15 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 45
Credit Suisse Group AG 16 Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen Girozentrale 47
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 17 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 49
Rabobank 18 Allied Irish Banks Plc >50
Nordea Bank AB 19 Banco Popular Espanol SA >50
Standard Chartered Plc 20 DekaBank >50
DZ Bank AG 21 KfW >50
Danske Bank A/S 22 NIBC Bank NV >50
Commerzbank AG 23 RaIffeisen Bank International AG >50
Source: Janský [27]; ranking by S&P Global Market Intelligence [50].
set data required by CRD IV. However, this still permits a
formula apportionment: if equal weighting is given to the
two variables on the economic substance of activities for
which data are available (turnover and full time equivalent
employees), then the European Union’s objective of “un-
derstand[ing]whether taxes are being paidwhere the actual
business activity takes place” is capable of being tested. It
is thismethodology that the empirical research reported in
this article is based upon.
Thebasis of calculationusedwas to collect thedata for
all banks and to then aggregate this, that is, the variables
reported by each bank for each country in which they op-
erated were aggregated for each year to create aggregated
totals for all banks in the sample by country by year. An
average of these totals by country was then prepared by to-
taling the yearly data and dividing by five. The logic for do-
ing this was to overcome the issues noted with tax liability
reporting being on inconsistent cash and accruals bases.
Over time, tax paid on a cash basis should approximate to
tax accrued if the accrual reporting is accurate: the aver-
aging process over a reasonable time period should, then,
have eliminated, as far as was possible, the impact of the
apparent data disparities arising because of poor regula-
tion. The process is, then, intended to improve the quality
of conclusions drawn. The resulting averaged aggregated
data were then reapportioned to countries based on a re-
stricted unitary apportionment formula. This apportioned
profits to states with half the allocation being based on the
location of turnover and half on the location of staff. The
resulting profit was then compared with the reported ag-
gregate average profit for the jurisdiction to note a gross
reallocation. Thiswas then subject to valuation for tax pur-
poses at the headline rate of tax applicable in the country
in question or as otherwise noted below.
5 Findings: technical problems of
data accuracy and reliability and
diverse interpretations of CBCR
The data were initially sorted for the purposes of the re-
search by bank and then by year. What quickly became
apparent was that there were significant issues with the
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data. Three problems appeared most important. The first
was that in some, but not all, cases, the turnover and profit
data reported were inconsistent with that reported by the
entity as a whole. This was because what might be termed
a “bottom-up” basis for disclosure has been adopted by
some, but not all, banks reporting Article 89 CRD IV data.
When this approach has been adopted, the local accounts
of the bank in questionhave beenused as the basis for CRD
IV reporting purposes, that is, this approach starts with
subsidiary level reporting and uses that as the basis for
CBCR . This, however, often results in intra-group trans-
actions being reported more than once, usually because
profit distributions from companies low in the corporate
hierarchy reappear as income received, and so as profit
arising, when accounted for in intermediate holding com-
panies. These intermediate holding companies are com-
mon in some locations, such as Luxembourg, for example3.
This double counting of income would be cancelled and
eliminated from view when preparing the group consoli-
dated accounts but is accounted formore than once in CRD
IV reportingwhen that is prepared on this “bottom-up” ba-
sis. The double-counting makes the country turnover data
at best unreliable and at worst exaggerated.
This has in turn given rise to a second problem. This
is the tendency of some banks to report profits or losses
as arising in “other,” unspecified, jurisdictions for CRD IV
reporting purposes. It is of course possible that some dis-
closures described as such may actually refer to otherwise
unspecified locations, for example, those that the bank in
question consider immaterial for separate reporting, even
though this appears contrary to the requirements of CRD
IV. More likely, these disclosures might also represent (or
do at least approximate to) the income that is potentially
double counted that the “bottom-up” basis of preparation
gives rise to, as previously noted. Overall the aggregate dis-
closure does appear to suggest this, but this cannot be con-
firmed on a bank-by-bank basis.
The third issue is that there has been a difference in in-
terpretation between countries when transcribing into lo-
cal legislation the CRD IV requirement that tax on profit
or loss be disclosed. For example, the United Kingdom in-
terpreted this demand as requiring the disclosure of cash
paid in settlement of corporation tax liabilities during the
3 This is an issue noted from the first time that CRD IV CBCR took
place. For example, see Barclays Bank plc 2013 country-by-country
report [4] and commentary upon it [38] that highlighted that high
levels of turnover reporting in Luxembourg appeared to arise for this
reason. It would appear that dividend income of intermediate holding
companies is reported as turnover not infrequently.
course of the year, following a precedent set by the Euro-
pean Union when previously requiring CBCR for compa-
nies operating in the extractive industries. Other countries,
such as France, more reasonably interpreted this demand
as requiring the disclosure of the corporation tax liability
that might be owed in respect of profits declared during
the course of a reporting period. The difference is signif-
icant: most of the corporation tax paid during the course
of any accounting period relates to profits arising in earlier
periods and this sumwill, therefore, not relate to the profit
declared in the current period. The cash paid in respect of
corporation tax during a periodmight then be significantly
different to the sum thatmight be due on the profits arising
during the course of the period in question.
The consequence of these differences is that a lack of
comparability arises for three reasons. First, the tax paid
declared in some countries cannot be readily compared
with the profits declared in those same countries because
they are stated on different accounting bases. This prob-
lem is exacerbated in those locations, such as the Nordic
states, where as Table 2 shows, tax reported for CRD IV pur-
poses is as disclosed in the income statement of the report-
ing bank,meaning that the disclosure in question includes
deferred tax provisions, whereas reporting in the United
Kingdom is intended to exclude such items but clearly
does not always do so despite that fact, as the reporting
of Standard Chartered and the Nationwide Building Soci-
ety reveals. Consistency to ensure comparability is a key
quality required of all accounting data, and it is absent in
these cases. It is possible that aggregation for a period of
time should eliminate at least some of these differences, al-
though this cannot beguaranteed,most especially if losses
also arise during a period. Second, comparison of Article
89 CRD IV data among countries where differing bases of
accounting apply is not necessarily possible in this case,
making the drawing of conclusions from this information
much harder. Third, because tax reporting in company ac-
counts is always undertaken, in the first instance, by com-
paring liabilities owed in respect of the period on profits
arising during the course of that same period, there is, as
a result of this reporting anomaly, a risk that the CRD IV
reporting of banks in places such as the United Kingdom
might not compare with the audited financial results of
the banks in question in such places. This risk also arises
when a “bottom-up” basis for reporting, startingwith local
accounts rather than from group consolidated accounts, is
used.
It is stressed that these various bases of reporting are
not, in themselves,wrong. A top-downapproachhasmerit
in offering a readily transparent reconciliation with the
published audited accounts, while, in contrast, a bottom-
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Table 2: Comparing CRD IV CBCR data with banks’ accounts for six UK banks in 2017 — Nordic banks
Banks Year Data
source
Turnover Profit
before tax
Tax per profit
and loss
account
Tax paid
per cash
flow
Employees
€m €m €m €m
Danske Bank A/S 2017 CRD IV 10,244 3,533 725 725 19,769
Danske Bank A/S 2017 Accounts 6,473 3,534 724 737 19,768
Danske Bank A/S 2017 Difference 3,771 (1) 1 (12) 1
DNB ASA 2017 CRD IV 5,535 2,877 542 542 9,561
DNB ASA 2017 Accounts 5,487 2,882 542 1,156 9,561
DNB ASA 2017 Difference 48 (5) (0) (614) 0
Nordea Bank AB 2017 CRD IV 9,469 3,998 950 950 31,437
Nordea Bank AB 2017 Accounts 9,469 3,998 950 950 30,399
Nordea Bank AB 2017 Difference 0 0 0 0 1,038
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 CRD IV 7,662 2,161 473 473 15,949
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 Accounts 4,679 2,160 474 244 15,946
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 Difference 2,983 1 (1) 229 3
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 CRD IV 4,325 2,182 547 547 11,832
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 Accounts 4,326 2,183 511 594 11,832
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 Difference (1) (1) 36 (47) 0
Swedbank AB 2017 CRD IV 4,496 2,548 537 537 14,588
Swedbank AB 2017 Accounts 4,405 2,548 538 386 14,588
Swedbank AB 2017 Difference 91 0 (1) 151 0
Source: Authors, based on the annual published accounts of the group parent companies of the noted banks for 2013 to 2017 inclusive and the CRD
IV reporting and of the same banks for those same years if publications were made [27], all values were translated, when necessary, into euros at
average exchange rates for the year in question published by Eurostat.
up approach might provide better quality information to
assist the appraisal of where the economic substance of
transactions really arises, which is the objective of CBCR.
Similarly, reporting both tax provisions in a profit and loss
account and tax paid is useful, not least because of the
comparison between the two that is enabled, although, un-
fortunately, CRD IVdoes not require both, unlike theOECD
CBCR requirement studied recently by Cobham et al. [13]
and Garcia Bernardo et al. [22]. The point is that there is
not error on display here, but that there is instead a lack
of precision in defining the required disclosures that has
given rise to the preparation of inconsistent data that are
undermined the objective of this process, which was to
reliably indicate whether profit-shifting was taking place,
where and by whom on a consistent and comparable ba-
sis. Requiring disclosure of tax provided in both the profit
and the loss account and paid as shown by the cash flow,
and the reconciliation of other variables to the published
accounting data if prepared on a bottom-up basis, would
overcomemost of these problems. Some banks have appre-
ciated the merits of such reconciliations and voluntarily
provide them: Barlcays Bank [5] being a notable example,
but the fact that they are an exception does reinforce this
point.
To compensate for these issues of comparability, and
because companies are required to report the corporation
tax that they pay in a period in their cash flow disclo-
sure under International Financial Reporting Standards,
it should be expected that the total CRD IV tax cash paid
should, on whatever basis it is reported, broadly reconcile
with these data in the financial statements instead. To test
this last hypothesis, and the potential scale of misreport-
ing that might arise from the use of bottom-up account-
ing approaches for CBCR, the data reported by bothNordic
and the UK banks in their Article 89 CRD IV reports were
compared with the similarly described disclosures made
in their audited financial statements for the same appar-
ent periods. In each case, the comparison was restricted
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Table 2: Comparing CRD IV CBCR data with banks’ accounts for six UK banks in 2017 — UK banks
Banks Year Data
source
Turnover Profit
before tax
Tax per profit
and loss
account
Tax paid
per cash
flow report
Full-time
employees
€m €m €m €m
Barclays Plc 2017 CRD IV 29,599 6,306 487 487 97,418
Barclays Plc 2017 Accounts 24,054 4,041 939 808 79,900
Barclays Plc 2017 Difference 5,545 2,265 (452) (321) 17,518
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 2017 CRD IV 21,295 6,021 1,172 1,172 69,556
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 2017 Accounts 21,296 6,020 1,427 1,173 69,726
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 2017 Difference (1) 1 (255) (1) (170)
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2017 CRD IV 14,999 2,567 606 606 73,980
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2017 Accounts 14,989 2,555 903 593 71,200
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2017 Difference 10 12 (297) 13 2,780
HSBC Holdings Plc 2017 CRD IV 60,285 14,680 2,371 2,371 233,126
HSBC Holdings Plc 2017 Accounts 44,063 15,227 3,782 2,816 244,788
HSBC Holdings Plc 2017 Difference 16,222 (547) (1,411) (445) (11,662)
Standard Chartered Plc 2017 CRD IV 13,681 3,063 726 726 86,794
Standard Chartered Plc 2017 Accounts 10,865 1,819 727 689 86,794
Standard Chartered Plc 2017 Difference 2,816 1,244 (1) 37 0
Nationwide Building Society 2017 CRD IV 3,855 1,234 339 339 17,295
Nationwide Building Society 2017 Accounts 3,824 1,203 339 339 18,761
Nationwide Building Society 2017 Difference 31 31 0 0 (1,466)
Source: Authors, based on the annual published accounts of the group parent companies of the noted banks for 2013 to 2017 inclusive and the CRD
IV reporting and of the same banks for those same years if publications were made [27], all values were translated, when necessary, into euros at
average exchange rates for the year in question published by Eurostat.
solely to the matter required to be disclosed by Article 89
reporting. The comparison was undertaken for each year
from 2013 onwards if data were available for that year and
for 2014–2017 in every case. The complete results are pre-
sented in Appendix 1, with that for 2017 being as shown in
Table 2, split between the two regions.
Aswill be noted for 2017, and asAppendix 1 alsomakes
clear for other years, there are differences of significance
between the two sources in the case ofmanyof these banks
and in both areas. In particular, although it would appear
that Nordea Bank, Svenska Handelsbanken, Lloyds Bank-
ing Group plc, and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
did almost certainly prepare their CRD IV reporting on
what might be called a “top-down” basis (i.e., they started
from the consolidated accounting data and attributed it
to its country of origin) to ensure that the CRD IV disclo-
sures made reconciled almost precisely with their audited
accounts, and the Nationwide Building Society, DNB, and
Swedbank might also have largely adopted this approach;
the other banks that reported appeared not to do so. They
did, instead, appear to adopt either a “bottom-up” ap-
proach or some other basis of accounting,withwhatmight
best be described as substantial differences in overall dis-
closure between the audited financial statements and the
CRD IV reports arising as a result, most especially with
regard to the reporting of turnover. These differences ap-
pear irreconcilable in some cases based on the disclosures
made. It is surprising that, on occasion, these differences
even extend to the number of employees. It should be
noted that the differences on cash flow should be treated
with caution: that in CRD IV, data are taken as being the
same as profit and loss data when no other information is
available because this disclosure is meant to represent tax
paid [18].
As a consequence and in an attempt to counter the re-
sulting possible distortions, a second aggregation was un-
dertaken for the sample of all banks for which data have
been collected. This aggregation created a single set of
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data for all the banks for all the reporting periods. The re-
sulting effective tax rates reported for each of the 144 ju-
risdictions (plus one “other” location) for which data were
collected is reportedby year and in sample aggregate inAp-
pendix 2. As is apparent from that data, the variations in re-
ported effective tax rates implicit in Article 89, CRD IV data
are substantial. The effective tax rate is calculated as the
ratio of tax declared to declared profits for these purposes.
What Appendix 2 alsomakes clear is that other ratios, such
as average turnover per employee and average profit per
employee, also produce anachronistic reporting based on
these data. Some is due to the small level of activity, but
much is not, while the average of more than 12,000 em-
ployees located in unknown jurisdictions makes no sense
at all.
To check the credibility of reported variations in the
calculated rates and effective tax rates, these were com-
pared with two recent publications reporting on those
rates. The first was from the OECD, published in January
2019 [41], which data set provides forward-looking or law-
based effective tax rates for 70 of the jurisdictions inwhich
banks reported the presence in their CRD IV data. The sec-
ond, in this case backward-looking or data-based effective
tax rates and thus similar to the estimates presented in this
article, is by one of the authors of this article [28], which
refers only to multinational companies within the Euro-
pean Union and covers the years 2011–2015. For the sake
of comparison statutory headline tax rates for all the ju-
risdictions that had data reported for them by banks sub-
ject to Article 89, CRD IV disclosure were also noted. One
data source for this was theOECD [41]. Anotherwas the list
published by KPMG [31] supplemented where data were
missing for jurisdictions for which banks had disclosed
data by information produced by other global professional
services firms (mainly EY and PricewaterhouseCoopers).
The resulting data are noted and compared in Appendix
3. There is surprising alignment between the effective tax
rates reported by the OECD and headline tax rates. In con-
trast, the effective tax rates reported by Janský [28] showed
greater variation, with some marked differences on occa-
sion. Those from the CRD IV data appear to bear little rela-
tionship to other reported rates in a great many cases: the
possible reasons for this have already been noted.
Despite these concerns about data quality, it was de-
cided to prepare tax gap estimates based on the CRD IV
data. This was because of the original objective of this
work. Itwas also thepurpose forwhichCBCRwasdesigned
[36]. In addition, the EuropeanUnion had stated thatwork-
ing out whether such gaps might arise was one of their in-
tendedpurposes that these datawere intended to facilitate
[18]. The unitary method for apportioning profits to juris-
dictions usedhas alreadybeennoted. The tax gap estimate
was prepared based on the averaged aggregated (i.e., all
bank) data for the 5-year period for which the sample of
banks reporting CRD IV data supplied information. These
data were used to then suggest average aggregated misal-
located profits. To estimate the tax impact of these misal-
locations across the sample as a whole, headline tax data
were used because of the uncertainties and discrepancies
noted in effective tax reporting and because effective tax
rate data were only available for about half the countries
for which data were reported. The effective tax rate data
based on CRD IV data appeared too unreliable to use. The
OECD reported headline tax rate was the preferred choice
of tax rate used for this purpose. When such data were
not available a rate secured from KPMG or another profes-
sional services firm was used instead. When no rate was
available, an average corporate income tax rate of 24%,
based on the KPMG data, was used instead. For the sake
of comparison, a second tax gap estimate was then pre-
pared for the EU member states alone. In this case, effec-
tive tax rate data from Janský [28] were used, with compar-
ison then being made to the tax gap data for those same
EU states based on their headline tax rates. To determine
tax gaps, profits over- and underreported by jurisdiction
are noted separately, which means that the tax gained or
lost is noted separately by jurisdiction as a consequence.
The results sorted in order of overall tax losses from profit
shifting to those gaining from the process are presented in
Appendix 4.
As that appendix notes, the process of profit-shifting
is, by definition, a zero sum game: the net gains and losses
must be equal because it is the profit of a single entity that
the unitary apportionment reallocates for the purpose of
preparing the tax gap estimate. This, however, is not true
of the tax gains and losses resulting from those relocated
profits. As expected, the data show that the countries suf-
fering losses fromprofit-shifting losemore than those gain-
ing appear to win from the process. Using the sample as
a whole, and, therefore, by implication relying on head-
line tax rates to represent effective tax rates, what is sur-
prising is that total losses, expressed in terms of tax rev-
enues, amount to €7.37bn but the gains are not much less,
at €6.47bn, implying a net worldwide gain for these banks
of approximately €0.9bn as a result. What the evidence
from the tax gap estimate for the EU members states does,
however, make clear is that using what is thought to be
muchmore credible data on effective tax rates has a signif-
icant impact on this calculation. Using headline tax rates,
the losses of the EU member states to profit-shifting by
the EU banks amounts to €5.31bn and the gain to €3.18bn,
at a net cost of €2.13bn. However, when the costs of the
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same profit-shifting are estimated using more credible ef-
fective tax rates both figures fall to €4.79bn and €1.63bn,
respectively, but the net cost rises considerably to €3.16bn
as a result. The main impact is to be seen in those loca-
tions with superficially high corporation tax rates but low
effective rates: Luxembourg is a prime example; it has the
third highest overall gain from profit misallocation (being
ranked behind Hong Kong and, rather surprisingly, Swe-
den, in this regard) but a substantial overall difference be-
tween nominal and effective tax rates. In this respect, the
findings replicate and support those of Brown et al. [7].
Overall, it is apparent that some expected jurisdic-
tions, such as Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Belgium, and Ire-
land, are gaining from profit misallocation, but so are
many other states that are not recognized as tax havens. In-
deed, many locations thought to be tax havens hardly fea-
ture in the misallocations: Jersey is the most notable to do
so,while theCayman Islands and theBritishVirgin Islands
are hardly noticeable, based upon these data. As expected
then, CBCR poses as many questions as it answers while
unambiguously suggesting that profit-shifting does create
significant costs for many states, of which the largest three
to suffer are Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, in that
order. Thequestion remains thoughas towhether the avail-
able data can sustain these conclusions.
6 Summary and discussion
As the evidence presented in this article shows, the objec-
tives stated by the European Union for the CRD IV CBCR
disclosures [18] have not been met, at least as they might
have desired. It is not possible to reliably appraisewhether
profits have been appropriately apportioned by the report-
ing banks to the jurisdictions in which they operate. Most
especially, it has not been possible to determine whether
tax is appropriately paid by each of them in each such loca-
tion. This is the consequence of a number of noted failings
inherent in the CRD IV regulation and in the way in which
it has been implemented by member states and individ-
ual banks. As has been noted, some of these failings result
from the way in which Article 89 of CRD IV was added to
that directive in considerable haste. However, as the noted
data on effective tax rates that have also been derived from
accounting data also reveal, some of these problems are
not peculiar to the CRD IV CBCR data. It would appear that
currently available accounting data, and the methods by
which it is generated and reported, do not provide suffi-
ciently robust data for the purposes of analyzing the ap-
propriateness of the tax payments made by multinational
corporations. These defects could not be overcome by au-
diting the CRD IV data, or incorporating it into the statu-
tory accounting framework of the companies in question:
they are instead implicit in thedesignof the regulation and
the limited scope of the data demanded. Although the mo-
tivation of those involved in this process was undoubtedly
well intentioned, the outcome was less than optimal.
A number of important lessons need to be drawn from
this research. First, those regulating corporate disclosures
required for the purposes of appraising the appropriate-
ness of tax payments must understand the need to require
sufficient relevant, reliable, comprehensive, and compara-
ble data to ensure that this task can be fulfilled. Theymust
in that case seek to ensure that sufficient data are available
for this purpose. The OECD version of CBCR does, for ex-
ample, include seven key variables to appraise the appro-
priateness of profit apportionment, including data on the
location of tangible asset investment [40]. The inclusion
of a more comprehensive data set for CRD IV, when the re-
quirementwas already known [33], would have assisted its
effectiveness.
Thereafter, it has to be appreciated that securing the
regulation is in itself an insufficient process: specific guid-
ance on its interpretation is required to ensure that its con-
sistent applicationoccurs inpractice. Failure to do thiswill
guarantee inconsistencies, and so a lack of comparability,
within any resulting data because it would seem (as the
Nordic and UK case studies included in this article make
clear) multinational corporations are inclined to interpret
reporting requirements in anyway that suits their purpose
unless specifically directed in their use.
Third, the CRD IV data did not appoint a regulator to
oversee and enforce the quality of the information sup-
plied as a result of the demands made by Article 89. This
was an obvious failing, and one that followed on from the
extractive industry’s directive, that cannot be replicated in
any future regulation that shares the objectives of this reg-
ulation. A mechanism to monitor reporting and to require
its correction has to be established if regulation of this sort
is to be effective.
These matters are of current significance: the Euro-
pean Commission still has an extant proposal for the pub-
lic reporting of CBCR data by all large multinational cor-
porations operating within the European Union. This pro-
posal has been stalled by the European Council at present.
The lessons from CRD IV must be taken into account be-
fore it progresses further. Effective accounting regulation
is essential in the fight against tax abuse. As yet, it would
seem that regulators havenot learnedhow todeliver it. The
result is that although some [e.g. 20] suggest that CRD IV
reporting has been of benefit in the fight against tax avoid-
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ance, this survey shows it could achievemuchmore. A sim-
ilar conclusion has, at least as far as data issues are con-
cerned, been reached by Cobham et al. [13] with regards to
initial reporting of OECD-based CBCR data. What appears
clear is that tax avoidance by profit-shifting will not be
beaten until reliable accounting underpins the effort.
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Appendix 1: Nordic and UK Banks: case study comparing accounting and CRD IV data
Banks Year Source Turnover
€m
Profit
before tax
€m
Tax paid per
profit and loss
account €m
Tax paid
per cash
flow €m
Full-time
employees
Nordic Banks
Danske Bank A/S 2013 CRD IV - - - - -
Danske Bank A/S 2014 CRD IV 11,548 1,068 537 537 18,603
Danske Bank A/S 2015 CRD IV 10,794 2,381 620 620 19,049
Danske Bank A/S 2016 CRD IV 10,665 3,405 738 738 19,303
Danske Bank A/S 2017 CRD IV 10,244 3,533 725 725 19,769
Danske Bank A/S Aggregate CRD IV 43,251 10,387 2,620 2,620 76,724
Danske Bank A/S 2013 Accounts
Danske Bank A/S 2014 Accounts 6,081 1,069 539 549 18,603
Danske Bank A/S 2015 Accounts 6,115 2,381 622 633 19,049
Danske Bank A/S 2016 Accounts 6,442 3,406 739 666 19,303
Danske Bank A/S 2017 Accounts 6,473 3,534 724 737 19,768
Danske Bank A/S Aggregate Accounts 25,110 10,390 2,624 2,585 76,723
Danske Bank A/S 2013 Difference - - - - -
Danske Bank A/S 2014 Difference 5,467 −1 −2 −12 -
Danske Bank A/S 2015 Difference 4,679 -0 −2 −13 -
Danske Bank A/S 2016 Difference 4,223 −1 −1 72 -
Danske Bank A/S 2017 Difference 3,771 −1 1 −12 1
Danske Bank A/S Aggregate Difference 18,141 −3 −4 35 1
DNB ASA 2013 CRD IV - - - - -
DNB ASA 2014 CRD IV - - 776 776 -
DNB ASA 2015 CRD IV - - 802 802 12,443
DNB ASA 2016 CRD IV - - 458 458 11,992
DNB ASA 2017 CRD IV 5,535 2,877 542 542 9,561
DNB ASA Aggregate CRD IV 5,535 2,877 2,578 2,578 33,996
DNB ASA 2013 Accounts
DNB ASA 2014 Accounts 774 359
DNB ASA 2015 Accounts 789 288 11,840
DNB ASA 2016 Accounts 446 314 11,459
DNB ASA 2017 Accounts 5,487 2,882 542 1,156 9,561
DNB ASA Aggregate Accounts 5,487 2,882 2,551 2,117 32,860
DNB ASA 2013 Difference - - - - -
DNB ASA 2014 Difference - - 2 417 -
DNB ASA 2015 Difference - - 13 514 603
DNB ASA 2016 Difference - - 12 144 533
DNB ASA 2017 Difference 48 −5 −0 −614 -
DNB ASA Aggregate Difference 48 −5 27 461 1,136
Nordea Bank AB 2013 CRD IV 10,217 3,994 976 976 29,107
Nordea Bank AB 2014 CRD IV 10,241 4,307 950 950 29,814
Nordea Bank AB 2015 CRD IV 10,141 4,704 1,042 1,042 29,681
Nordea Bank AB 2016 CRD IV 9,927 4,625 859 859 30,873
Nordea Bank AB 2017 CRD IV 9,469 3,998 950 950 31,437
Nordea Bank AB Aggregate CRD IV 49,995 21,628 4,777 4,777 150,912
Nordea Bank AB 2013 Accounts 9,891 4,116 1,009 1,010 29,429
Nordea Bank AB 2014 Accounts 10,241 4,307 950 966 29,643
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Nordea Bank AB 2015 Accounts 10,140 4,704 1,042 1,056 29,815
Nordea Bank AB 2016 Accounts 9,927 4,625 859 952 31,596
Nordea Bank AB 2017 Accounts 9,469 3,998 950 950 30,399
Nordea Bank AB Aggregate Accounts 49,668 21,750 4,810 4,934 150,882
Nordea Bank AB 2013 Difference 326 −122 −33 −34 −322
Nordea Bank AB 2014 Difference - - - −16 171
Nordea Bank AB 2015 Difference 1 - - −14 −134
Nordea Bank AB 2016 Difference - - - −93 −723
Nordea Bank AB 2017 Difference - - - - 1,038
Nordea Bank AB Aggregate Difference 327 −122 −33 −157 30
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2013 CRD IV 9,720 2,094 385 385 17,096
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2014 CRD IV 9,123 2,557 457 457 16,702
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2015 CRD IV 8,117 2,230 460 460 16,599
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2016 CRD IV 7,630 1,572 448 448 16,260
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 CRD IV 7,662 2,161 473 473 15,949
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Aggregate CRD IV 42,252 10,614 2,223 2,223 82,606
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2013 Accounts 4,749 2,095 386 150 17,096
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2014 Accounts 4,786 2,568 454 318 16,742
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2015 Accounts 4,775 2,230 458 180 16,599
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2016 Accounts 4,572 1,571 449 373 16,260
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 Accounts 4,679 2,160 474 244 15,946
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Aggregate Accounts 23,560 10,626 2,221 1,266 82,643
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2013 Difference 4,971 −1 −1 235 -
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2014 Difference 4,337 −11 3 139 −40
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2015 Difference 3,342 -0 2 280 -
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2016 Difference 3,058 1 −1 75 -
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 2017 Difference 2,983 1 −1 229 3
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Aggregate Difference 18,692 −12 2 957 −37
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2013 CRD IV 4,200 2,092 453 453 -
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2014 CRD IV 4,215 2,113 447 447 11,585
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2015 CRD IV 4,312 2,187 457 457 11,821
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2016 CRD IV 4,309 2,184 402 402 11,759
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 CRD IV 4,325 2,182 547 547 11,832
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Aggregate CRD IV 21,361 10,758 2,306 2,306 46,997
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2013 Accounts 4,199 2,091 453 575 -
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2014 Accounts 3,868 1,928 421 430 11,692
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2015 Accounts 4,062 2,140 446 451 11,819
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2016 Accounts 4,309 2,181 465 586 11,759
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 Accounts 4,326 2,183 511 594 11,832
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Aggregate Accounts 20,764 10,522 2,296 2,636 47,102
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2013 Difference 1 1 0 −122 -
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2014 Difference 347 185 26 17 −107
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2015 Difference 250 47 11 6 2
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2016 Difference 0 3 −63 −184 -
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 2017 Difference −1 −1 36 −47 -
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Aggregate Difference 597 236 10 −330 −105
Swedbank AB 2013 CRD IV 4,317 2,238 474 474 14,265
Swedbank AB 2014 CRD IV 4,376 2,484 474 474 14,583
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Swedbank AB 2015 CRD IV 4,053 2,174 495 495 13,893
Swedbank AB 2016 CRD IV 4,469 2,510 446 446 14,009
Swedbank AB 2017 CRD IV 4,496 2,548 537 537 14,588
Swedbank AB Aggregate CRD IV 21,711 11,954 2,426 2,426 71,338
Swedbank AB 2013 Accounts 4,223 2,237 474 342 14,265
Swedbank AB 2014 Accounts 4,270 2,313 473 604 14,583
Swedbank AB 2015 Accounts 3,967 2,178 494 498 13,893
Swedbank AB 2016 Accounts 4,315 2,512 445 379 14,061
Swedbank AB 2017 Accounts 4,405 2,548 538 386 14,588
Swedbank AB Aggregate Accounts 21,181 11,787 2,424 2,209 71,390
Swedbank AB 2013 Difference 94 1 0 132 0
Swedbank AB 2014 Difference 106 171 1 (130) 0
Swedbank AB 2015 Difference 86 (4) 1 (3) 0
Swedbank AB 2016 Difference 154 (2) 1 67 (52)
Swedbank AB 2017 Difference 91 0 (1) 151 0
Swedbank AB Aggregate Difference 530 167 2 217 (52)
UK Banks
Barclays plc 2013 CRD IV 42,929 10,718 8,888 8,888 140,282
Barclays plc 2014 CRD IV 38,429 6,873 1,272 1,272 135,336
Barclays plc 2015 CRD IV 40,505 4,992 1,615 1,615 130,900
Barclays plc 2016 CRD IV 37,076 8,809 859 859 122,947
Barclays plc 2017 CRD IV 29,599 6,306 487 487 97,418
Barclays plc Aggregate CRD IV 188,538 37,698 13,121 13,121 626,883
Barclays plc 2013 Accounts 29,282 3,378 2,536 1,835 139,600
Barclays plc 2014 Accounts 28,694 2,800 1,740 1,926 132,300
Barclays plc 2015 Accounts 32,167 2,857 2,368 2,302 129,400
Barclays plc 2016 Accounts 26,254 3,953 655 955 119,300
Barclays plc 2017 Accounts 24,054 4,041 939 808 79,900
Barclays plc Aggregate Accounts 140,452 17,029 8,237 7,825 600,500
Barclays plc 2013 Difference 13,647 7,340 6,352 7,053 682
Barclays plc 2014 Difference 9,735 4,073 −468 −654 3,036
Barclays plc 2015 Difference 8,338 2,135 −753 −687 1,500
Barclays plc 2016 Difference 10,822 4,856 204 −96 3,647
Barclays plc 2017 Difference 5,545 2,265 −452 −321 17,518
Barclays plc Aggregate Difference 48,086 20,669 4,884 5,296 26,383
Lloyds Banking Group 2013 CRD IV - - - - -
Lloyds Banking Group 2014 CRD IV 20,352 2,187 40 40 89,074
Lloyds Banking Group 2015 CRD IV 24,009 2,266 247 247 82,200
Lloyds Banking Group 2016 CRD IV 21,134 5,187 1,007 1,007 72,870
Lloyds Banking Group 2017 CRD IV 21,295 6,021 1,172 1,172 69,556
Lloyds Banking Group Aggregate CRD IV 86,790 15,661 2,466 2,466 313,700
Lloyds Banking Group 2013 Accounts - - - - -
Lloyds Banking Group 2014 Accounts 20,353 2,187 −19 41 90,844
Lloyds Banking Group 2015 Accounts 24,010 2,266 788 247 89,300
Lloyds Banking Group 2016 Accounts 21,133 5,187 1,067 1,006 71,888
Lloyds Banking Group 2017 Accounts 21,296 6,020 1,427 1,173 69,726
Lloyds Banking Group Aggregate Accounts 86,791 15,660 3,264 2,467 321,758
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Lloyds Banking Group 2013 Difference - - - - -
Lloyds Banking Group 2014 Difference −1 0 59 −1 −1,770
Lloyds Banking Group 2015 Difference −1 0 −541 0 −7,100
Lloyds Banking Group 2016 Difference 1 0 −60 1 982
Lloyds Banking Group 2017 Difference −1 1 −255 −1 −170
Lloyds Banking Group Aggregate Difference −1 1 −798 −1 −8,058
Royal Bank of Scotland 2013 CRD IV - - - - -
Royal Bank of Scotland 2014 CRD IV 18,804 3,281 220 220 94,640
Royal Bank of Scotland 2015 CRD IV 17,810 −3,725 73 73 91,839
Royal Bank of Scotland 2016 CRD IV 15,409 −4,996 167 167 85,533
Royal Bank of Scotland 2017 CRD IV 14,999 2,567 606 606 73,980
Royal Bank of Scotland Aggregate CRD IV 67,022 −2,873 1,066 1,066 345,992
Royal Bank of Scotland 2013 Accounts - - - - -
Royal Bank of Scotland 2014 Accounts 18,803 3,280 514 218 95,600
Royal Bank of Scotland 2015 Accounts 17,810 −3,725 40 101 93,659
Royal Bank of Scotland 2016 Accounts 15,409 −4,996 1,150 209 77,900
Royal Bank of Scotland 2017 Accounts 14,989 2,555 903 593 71,200
Royal Bank of Scotland Aggregate Accounts 67,011 −2,886 2,607 1,122 338,359
Royal Bank of Scotland 2013 Difference - - - - -
Royal Bank of Scotland 2014 Difference 1 1 −294 2 −960
Royal Bank of Scotland 2015 Difference -0 0 33 −28 −1,820
Royal Bank of Scotland 2016 Difference 0 -0 −983 −42 7,633
Royal Bank of Scotland 2017 Difference 10 12 −297 13 2,780
Royal Bank of Scotla Aggregate Difference 11 13 −1,541 −56 7,633
HSBC Holdings plc 2013 CRD IV 51,691 - - - 258,692
HSBC Holdings plc 2014 CRD IV 46,179 14,086 2,699 2,699 256,286
HSBC Holdings plc 2015 CRD IV 53,917 17,008 3,034 3,034 258,954
HSBC Holdings plc 2016 CRD IV 56,932 13,843 2,934 2,934 245,526
HSBC Holdings plc 2017 CRD IV 60,285 14,680 2,371 2,371 233,126
HSBC Holdings plc Aggregate CRD IV 269,004 59,617 11,038 11,038 1,252,584
HSBC Holdings plc 2013 Accounts 44,285 - - - 268,795
HSBC Holdings plc 2014 Accounts 43,272 14,083 2,978 2,694 264,767
HSBC Holdings plc 2015 Accounts 50,561 17,010 3,423 3,473 268,433
HSBC Holdings plc 2016 Accounts 40,283 6,429 3,316 2,950 246,933
HSBC Holdings plc 2017 Accounts 44,063 15,227 3,782 2,816 244,788
HSBC Holdings plc Aggregate Accounts 222,463 52,749 13,500 11,933 1,293,716
HSBC Holdings plc 2013 Difference 7,406 - - - −10,103
HSBC Holdings plc 2014 Difference 2,907 3 −279 5 −8,481
HSBC Holdings plc 2015 Difference 3,356 −2 −389 −439 −9,479
HSBC Holdings plc 2016 Difference 16,649 7,414 −382 −16 −1,407
HSBC Holdings plc 2017 Difference 16,222 −547 −1,411 −445 −11,662
HSBC Holdings plc Aggregate Difference 46,541 6,868 −2,462 −895 −41,132
Standard Chartered 2013 CRD IV 13,836 5,785 1,181 1,181 88,257
Standard Chartered 2014 CRD IV 6,128 2,175 - - -
Standard Chartered 2015 CRD IV 15,750 −902 1,014 1,014 87,318
Standard Chartered 2016 CRD IV 13,782 1,216 1,032 1,032 84,916
Standard Chartered 2017 CRD IV 13,681 3,063 726 726 86,794
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Standard Chartered Aggregate CRD IV 63,177 11,337 3,953 3,953 347,285
Standard Chartered 2013 Accounts 14,143 4,567 1,268 1,292 86,640
Standard Chartered 2014 Accounts 13,809 3,190 - - -
Standard Chartered 2015 Accounts 11,516 −1,147 882 968 84,076
Standard Chartered 2016 Accounts 10,590 308 607 969 86,693
Standard Chartered 2017 Accounts 10,865 1,819 727 689 86,794
Standard Chartered Aggregate Accounts 60,923 8,737 3,484 3,919 344,203
Standard Chartered 2013 Difference −307 1,218 −87 −111 1,617
Standard Chartered 2014 Difference −7,681 −1,015 - - -
Standard Chartered 2015 Difference 4,234 245 132 46 3,242
Standard Chartered 2016 Difference 3,192 908 425 63 −1,777
Standard Chartered 2017 Difference 2,816 1,244 −1 37 -
Standard Chartered Aggregate Difference 2,254 2,600 469 34 3,082
Nationwide 2013 CRD IV 0 0 0 0 0
Nationwide 2014 CRD IV 3,766 0 0 0 15,732
Nationwide 2015 CRD IV 4,331 1,439 227 227 16,200
Nationwide 2016 CRD IV 4,178 1,617 310 310 16,625
Nationwide 2017 CRD IV 3,855 1,234 339 339 17,295
Nationwide Aggregate CRD IV 16,130 4,290 876 876 65,852
Nationwide 2013 Accounts 0 0 0 0 0
Nationwide 2014 Accounts 3,530 0 0 0 17,268
Nationwide 2015 Accounts 4,332 1,439 266 227 17,622
Nationwide 2016 Accounts 4,127 1,565 394 311 18,109
Nationwide 2017 Accounts 3,824 1,203 339 339 18,761
Nationwide Aggregate Accounts 15,813 4,207 999 877 71,760
Nationwide 2013 Difference 0 0 0 0 0
Nationwide 2014 Difference 236 0 0 0 (1,536)
Nationwide 2015 Difference (1) 0 (39) (0) (1,422)
Nationwide 2016 Difference 51 52 (84) (1) (1,484)
Nationwide 2017 Difference 31 31 0 0 (1,466)
Nationwide Aggregate Difference 317 83 (123) (1) (5,908)
Sources: CRD IV data and annual reports, all values are translated to euros at annual average rates wherever required to do so.
Appendix 2: Averaged bank data for a -year period for all countries referred to in CRD IV reporting by the banks surveyed for the -year
period, 2013–2017, with supporting calculations on the average effective tax rates, average turnover per employee, and average profit per
employee by jurisdiction for this period
Countries Average
turnover
€’m
Average
profit before
tax €’m
Average
reported tax
€’m
Average full
time
employees
Average
effective tax
rate %
Average
turnover per
employee
€’000
Average profit
per employee
%
Others (2,430) (1,456) 83 12,686 (5.7%) (192) (115)
Albania 131 27 4 1,998 16.4% 66 13
Algeria 318 139 39 3,230 28.0% 99 43
Angola 6 1 0 21 14.3% 299 65
Argentina 3,083 1,127 390 15,493 34.7% 199 73
Armenia 25 (1) 2 275 (333.3%) 92 (2)
Australia 2,555 843 295 4,743 35.0% 539 178
Austria 6,143 935 278 26,852 29.7% 229 35
Bahamas 55 27 0 57 0.0% 958 474
Bahrain 205 37 0 886 0.0% 231 42
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Bangladesh 317 198 89 2,257 44.7% 140 88
Belarus 157 86 23 1,636 26.2% 96 53
Belgium 13,367 4,029 1,092 43,455 27.1% 308 93
Benin 16 (5) (2) 190 37.0% 83 (28)
Bermuda 247 117 0 466 0.0% 529 250
Bolivia 18 4 1 273 25.0% 65 15
Bosnia and Herzegovina 273 82 10 3,316 12.7% 82 25
Botswana 166 37 9 1,753 25.5% 95 21
Brazil 13,788 2,750 1,003 52,995 36.5% 260 52
Brunei 54 7 5 578 77.1% 94 12
Bulgaria 803 278 26 10,765 9.4% 75 26
Burkina Faso 49 14 2 507 15.9% 97 27
Cambodia 0 0 (0) 30 (50.0%) 7 13
Cameroon 151 45 17 1,159 37.8% 130 39
Canada 1,856 563 132 6,488 23.5% 286 87
Cayman Islands (46) 53 (0) 30 (0.4%) (1,547) 1,780
Chad 18 0 1 169 200.0% 108 2
Channel Islands 415 236 16 1,000 6.8% 415 236
Chile 2,882 1,466 286 13,977 19.5% 206 105
China, P.R.: Mainland 3,935 2,407 165 29,310 6.9% 134 82
China with HK 163 53 10 400 19.6% 407 133
Colombia 794 296 120 5,808 40.6% 137 51
Congo, Republic of 17 5 2 171 43.5% 102 27
Croatia 1,773 336 71 13,917 21.2% 127 24
Curacao 115 (24) 1 44 (4.2%) 2,621 (543)
Cyprus 7 6 1 36 21.4% 208 157
Czech Republic 4,621 2,226 482 32,456 21.7% 142 69
Denmark 9,590 2,723 571 18,347 21.0% 523 148
Djibouti 19 (1) (0) 208 25.0% 89 (4)
Ecuador 2 0 0 18 100.0% 87 11
Egypt 1,097 560 135 11,019 24.1% 100 51
Estonia 629 286 67 3,710 23.4% 170 77
Equatorial Guinea 26 10 4 234 43.8% 111 41
Falkland Islands 2 1 0 17 0.0% 116 58
Fiji 4 (1) 0 80 0.0% 45 (13)
Finland 3,423 1,396 340 9,635 24.3% 355 145
France 65,307 12,799 4,604 293,347 36.0% 223 44
French Polynesia 86 22 13 459 57.1% 187 49
Gambia 6 1 0 124 50.0% 47 6
Georgia 484 (456) 5 1,516 (1.2%) 319 (301)
Germany 48,907 8,137 1,960 165,732 24.1% 295 49
Ghana 300 143 41 2,341 28.8% 128 61
Gibraltar 880 337 66 3,447 19.7% 255 98
United Kingdom 86,649 10,139 3,830 266,560 37.8% 325 38
Greece 90 (43) 9 453 (21.9%) 199 (95)
Guernsey 212 111 9 430 8.3% 494 258
Guinea 43 16 6 368 36.3% 116 44
Hong Kong, China 18,252 8,038 960 40,796 11.9% 447 197
Hungary 1,855 70 106 14,484 150.6% 128 5
India 4,011 1,653 728 96,003 44.0% 42 17
Indonesia 904 190 86 9,031 45.2% 100 21
Iraq 20 16 0 15 2.6% 1,342 1,068
Ireland 5,466 2,742 126 15,653 4.6% 349 175
Isle of Man 376 198 14 1,113 7.1% 338 178
Israel 76 33 10 192 31.3% 394 170
Italy 40,602 117 1,057 166,016 902.0% 245 1
Ivory Coast 181 60 12 1,586 20.7% 114 38
Japan 2,179 740 237 3,354 32.0% 650 221
Jersey 901 504 25 1,885 4.9% 478 267
Jordan 29 8 5 183 58.5% 160 45
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Kazakhstan 18 6 1 153 20.7% 118 38
Kenya 415 171 58 3,986 34.0% 104 43
Kosovo 42 16 2 686 10.0% 61 23
Kuwait 37 16 0 84 1.3% 444 188
Laos 6 1 0 134 0.0% 43 7
Latvia 467 185 31 3,587 16.8% 130 52
Lebanon 32 27 3 172 10.9% 189 159
Liechtenstein 1 0 0 3 N/A 333 0
Lithuania 539 228 38 5,865 16.7% 92 39
Luxembourg 8,823 4,571 691 12,354 15.1% 714 370
Macao, China 75 49 5 191 10.7% 392 256
Macedonia, F.Y.R. 19 5 0 308 8.3% 61 16
Madagascar 66 35 7 980 20.3% 68 36
Malaysia 1,500 438 99 14,934 22.6% 100 29
Maldives 14 12 4 20 32.2% 707 596
Mali 14 2 1 96 33.3% 146 19
Malta 268 170 23 1,111 13.7% 241 153
Marshall Islands (18) (24) 0 0 0.0% N/A N/A
Mauritius 407 297 13 1,562 4.2% 260 190
Mexico 10,376 3,955 1,068 60,885 27.0% 170 65
Moldova 22 9 1 579 13.3% 38 16
Monaco 543 170 33 1,369 19.7% 397 124
Montenegro 19 6 1 224 13.3% 86 27
Morocco 784 218 81 8,355 36.9% 94 26
Mozambique 31 6 0 457 0.0% 68 13
Namibia 0 0 0 2 N/A 0 0
Nepal 81 30 5 480 17.4% 168 62
Netherlands 27,745 4,354 1,044 67,312 24.0% 412 65
New Caledonia 119 54 22 602 41.2% 197 90
New Zealand 409 147 38 504 25.9% 811 292
Nigeria 144 74 4 734 4.9% 196 101
Norway 5,208 2,592 860 11,495 33.2% 453 225
Oman 148 33 4 884 12.7% 168 37
Pakistan 196 104 41 3,216 39.8% 61 32
Panama 3 2 4 4 237.5% 800 400
Paraguay 63 20 4 374 17.6% 167 54
Peru 924 438 155 4,879 35.4% 189 90
Philippines 306 63 16 6,567 25.4% 47 10
Poland 6,028 2,080 516 65,420 24.8% 92 32
Portugal 1,903 599 130 10,997 21.7% 173 54
Puerto Rico 292 30 21 1,145 68.7% 255 26
Qatar 175 79 7 382 9.1% 458 208
Romania 2,331 325 40 26,050 12.3% 89 12
Russia 3,080 1,011 234 30,263 23.2% 102 33
Saint-Martin, France 2 0 0 6 0.0% 313 31
Saudi Arabia 126 414 6 96 1.4% 1,315 4,315
Senegal 106 15 6 1,063 39.7% 100 14
Serbia 693 214 17 8,827 7.9% 79 24
Seychelles 13 6 2 96 31.3% 139 66
Sierra Leone 20 9 2 106 17.8% 189 85
Singapore 6,343 1,279 177 20,005 13.8% 317 64
Slovakia 1,899 701 158 14,909 22.6% 127 47
Slovenia 269 65 11 2,127 17.5% 127 31
South Africa 3,570 1,056 267 29,333 25.3% 122 36
Korea, Rep. 1,608 (102) 67 5,619 (65.5%) 286 (18)
Spain 22,194 411 963 92,470 234.0% 240 4
Sri Lanka 205 109 50 3,829 46.4% 54 28
Sweden 15,094 5,846 1,244 29,909 21.3% 505 195
Switzerland 2,633 (550) 78 6,888 (14.2%) 382 (80)
Unauthentifiziert   | Heruntergeladen  06.01.20 08:52   UTC
20 | R. Murphy et al.
Taiwan Province of
China
911 211 31 5,809 14.8% 157 36
Tanzania 134 22 6 1,864 28.7% 72 12
Thailand 265 26 17 2,182 66.2% 121 12
Togo 2 0 0 17 100.0% 133 12
Tunisia 176 51 19 2,621 37.1% 67 20
Turkey 4,490 1,558 305 34,787 19.6% 129 45
United Arab Emirates 2,211 515 106 6,023 20.7% 367 85
Uganda 98 30 3 883 10.6% 111 34
Ukraine 472 (294) 14 21,468 (4.6%) 22 (14)
Uruguay 443 137 39 1,931 28.7% 229 71
United States 41,817 5,093 1,637 84,586 32.1% 494 60
Vanuatu 9 3 0 97 6.7% 93 31
Venezuela 333 100 72 3,945 72.1% 84 25
Vietnam 242 69 15 2,198 21.2% 110 31
British Virgin Islands 4 4 0 0 0.0% N/A N/A
Zambia 148 58 18 1,472 31.2% 101 40
Zimbabwe 75 16 6 888 37.8% 84 18
Total above 528,909 107,168 30,327 2,153,242 28.3% 246 50
Appendix 3: Comparisons of headline and effective tax rates
Headline tax rates Effective tax rates Differences
Country CT rate
per
OECD
%
CT rate
per
KPMG
etc. %
CT rate
per P
-ky %
CT rate
used %
ETR per
OECD
%
ETR per
CRD IV
Data %
ETR per
P
Janský
%
Headline
TR used
and ETR
per OECD
%
ETR per
OECD
and
CRD IV
%
Albania 15.00 15.0 14.5 16.4 0.5 (1.9)
Andorra 10.0 10.00 10.0 8.8 1.2
Argentina 30.0 30.00 30.0 35.7 34.7 (5.7) 1.0
Botswana 22.0 22.00 22.0 27.3 25.5 (5.3) 1.8
Brazil 34.0 34.00 34.0 29.9 36.5 4.1 (6.6)
British Virgin Islands 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bulgaria 10.0 10.00 10.0 10.0 9.1 9.4 10.0 0.9 (0.3)
Cayman Islands 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 −0.4 0.0 0.4
China (People’s Republic of) 25.0 25.00 25.0 23.6 6.9 1.4 16.7
Croatia 18.0 20.00 20.0 20.0 15.6 21.2 15.0 4.4 (5.6)
Curacao 22.0 22.00 22.0 20.5 −4.2 1.5 24.7
Cyprus 12.50 12.0 12.5 11.9 21.4 10.0 0.6 (9.5)
Democratic Republic of the Congo 35.0 35.00 35.0 31.6 43.5 3.4 (11.9)
Guernsey 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 (8.3)
Hong Kong, China 16.5 16.50 16.5 15.2 11.9 1.3 3.3
India 48.3 34.61 34.6 44.1 44.0 (9.5) 0.1
Indonesia 25.0 25.00 25.0 22.4 45.2 2.6 (22.8)
Isle of Man 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 (7.1)
Jamaica 25.0 25.0 23.3 1.7
Jersey 0.0 20.00 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 (4.9)
Kenya 30.0 30.00 30.0 26.8 34.0 3.2 (7.2)
Liechtenstein 12.5 12.50 12.5 10.1 0.0 2.4 10.1
Macau, China 12.0 12.00 12.0 11.5 10.7 0.5 0.8
Malta 35.0 35.00 35.0 35.0 33.3 13.7 16.0 1.7 19.6
Mauritius 15.0 15.00 15.0 14.0 4.2 1.0 9.8
Montserrat 30.0 30.0 30.4 (0.4)
Peru 29.5 29.50 29.5 28.1 35.4 1.4 (7.3)
Romania 16.0 16.00 16.0 16.0 14.5 12.3 17.0 1.5 2.2
Russia 20.0 20.00 20.0 18.8 23.2 1.2 (4.4)
Saudi Arabia 0.0 20.00 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 (1.4)
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Senegal 30.0 30.00 30.0 27.6 39.7 2.4 (12.1)
Seychelles 30.0 30.0 28.3 31.3 1.7 (3.0)
Singapore 17.0 17.00 17.0 16.2 13.8 0.8 2.4
South Africa 28.0 28.00 28.0 27.1 25.3 0.9 1.8
Thailand 20.0 20.00 20.0 21.6 66.2 (1.6) (44.6)
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Australia 30.0 30.00 30.0 31.4 35.0 (1.4) (3.6)
Austria 25.0 25.00 25.0 25.0 23.7 9.5 13.0 1.3 14.2
Belgium 29.6 29.00 34.0 29.6 26.0 27.1 14.0 3.6 (1.1)
Canada 26.8 26.50 26.8 24.7 23.5 2.1 1.2
Chile 25.0 26.00 25.0 31.8 19.5 (6.8) 12.3
Czech Republic 19.0 19.00 19.0 19.0 20.6 21.7 15.0 (1.6) (1.1)
Denmark 22.0 22.00 24.0 22.0 19.5 21.0 19.0 2.5 (1.5)
Estonia 20.0 20.00 21.0 20.0 17.0 23.4 14.0 3.0 (6.4)
Finland 20.0 20.00 23.0 20.0 19.0 24.3 12.0 1.0 (5.3)
France 34.4 33.00 33.0 33.0 33.0 36.0 17.0 0.0 (3.0)
Germany 29.8 30.00 30.0 29.8 27.3 24.1 20.0 2.5 3.2
Greece 29.0 29.00 24.0 29.0 27.6 −21.9 28.0 1.4 49.5
Hungary 9.0 9.00 19.0 9.0 9.9 150.6 8.0 (0.9) (140.7)
Iceland 20.0 20.00 20.0 18.8 1.2
Ireland 12.5 12.50 13.0 12.5 11.8 4.6 16.0 0.7 7.2
Israel 23.0 23.00 23.0 22.9 31.3 0.1 (8.4)
Italy 27.8 24.00 31.0 24.0 22.1 902.0 30.0 1.9 (879.9)
Japan 29.7 30.86 29.7 27.5 32.0 2.2 (4.5)
Korea 27.5 25.00 25.0 23.2 −65.5 1.8 88.7
Latvia 20.0 20.00 15.0 20.0 13.5 16.8 11.0 6.5 (3.3)
Lithuania 15.0 15.00 15.0 15.0 13.3 16.7 12.0 1.7 (3.4)
Luxembourg 26.0 26.01 29.0 26.0 24.5 15.1 2.0 1.5 9.4
Mexico 30.0 30.00 30.0 27.4 27.0 2.6 0.4
Netherlands 25.0 25.00 25.0 25.0 23.0 24.0 10.0 2.0 (1.0)
New Zealand 28.0 28.00 28.0 26.8 25.9 1.2 0.9
Norway 23.0 23.00 23.0 23.1 33.2 (0.1) (10.1)
Poland 19.0 19.00 19.0 19.0 17.6 24.8 17.0 1.4 (7.2)
Portugal 31.5 21.00 24.0 31.5 27.5 21.7 18.0 4.0 5.8
Slovak Republic 21.0 21.00 21.0 21.0 21.8 22.6 20.0 (0.8) (0.8)
Slovenia 19.0 19.00 18.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 14.0 1.1 0.4
Spain 25.0 25.00 30.0 25.0 24.8 234.0 22.0 0.2 (209.2)
Sweden 22.0 22.00 24.0 22.0 19.8 21.3 13.0 2.2 (1.5)
Switzerland 21.1 18.00 21.1 19.5 −14.2 1.6 33.7
Turkey 22.0 22.00 22.0 20.2 19.6 1.8 0.6
United Kingdom 19.0 19.00 23.0 19.0 19.0 37.8 15.0 0.0 (18.8)
United States 25.8 27.00 25.8 34.2 32.1 (8.4) 2.1
Sources as noted in text: CRD IV data, authors’ calculations
Appendix 4: Tax gaps by countries for all jurisdictions and the EU member states
Authors’ calculations as noted in text
Names Countries Average profit
misallocation €’m
Tax rate
used for
main
estimate %
Average
total tax
cost €’m
Average
total tax
gain €’m
Average EU
tax cost
€’m
Average
EU tax
gain €’m
All banks Italy (8,127.6) 27.8 (2,259.5) 0.0 (2,438.3) 0.0
All banks Spain (4,138.2) 25.0 (1,034.5) 0.0 (910.4) 0.0
All banks United Kingdom (5,273.0) 19.0 (1,001.9) 0.0 (790.9) 0.0
All banks India (1,142.4) 48.3 (551.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks France (1,117.1) 34.4 (384.3) 0.0 (189.9) 0.0
All banks Other (1,525.1) 24.0 (366.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks United States (1,248.8) 25.8 (322.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Germany (941.8) 29.8 (280.7) 0.0 (188.4) 0.0
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All banks Switzerland (988.4) 21.1 (208.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Ukraine (876.3) 18.0 (157.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Korea, Rep. (404.7) 27.5 (111.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Romania (559.6) 16.0 (89.5) 0.0 (95.1) 0.0
All banks Austria (355.1) 25.0 (88.8) 0.0 (46.2) 0.0
All banks Georgia (542.8) 15.0 (81.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Hungary (478.0) 9.0 (43.0) 0.0 (38.2) 0.0
All banks Philippines (131.4) 30.0 (39.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Croatia (190.3) 18.0 (34.3) 0.0 (28.5) 0.0
All banks Netherlands (132.3) 25.0 (33.1) 0.0 (13.2) 0.0
All banks Indonesia (126.1) 25.0 (31.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Poland (158.9) 19.0 (30.2) 0.0 (27.0) 0.0
All banks Morocco (69.2) 31.0 (21.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Malaysia (85.6) 24.0 (20.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Greece (63.4) 29.0 (18.4) 0.0 (17.8) 0.0
All banks Tanzania (38.4) 30.0 (11.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Serbia (76.3) 15.0 (11.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Thailand (55.1) 20.0 (11.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Venezuela (31.7) 34.0 (10.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Russia (53.7) 20.0 (10.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks South Africa (36.0) 28.0 (10.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Curacao (36.5) 22.0 (8.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Tunisia (31.8) 25.0 (8.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Bulgaria (71.2) 10.0 (7.1) 0.0 (7.1) 0.0
All banks Senegal (22.6) 30.0 (6.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Puerto Rico (28.1) 24.0 (6.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Albania (36.2) 15.0 (5.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Marshall Islands (22.4) 24.0 (5.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Botswana (23.6) 22.0 (5.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Taiwan Province of China (25.6) 17.0 (4.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Benin (11.7) 30.0 (3.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Zimbabwe (13.3) 25.0 (3.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Slovenia (15.0) 19.0 (2.8) 0.0 (2.1) 0.0
All banks Bosnia and Herzegovina (28.2) 10.0 (2.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Mozambique (8.7) 32.0 (2.8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Brunei (12.9) 18.5 (2.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Sri Lanka (7.5) 28.0 (2.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Vietnam (10.4) 20.0 (2.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Armenia (10.0) 20.0 (2.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Djibouti (7.9) 25.0 (2.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Chad (5.7) 24.0 (1.4) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Kosovo (5.3) 24.0 (1.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Bolivia (4.6) 25.0 (1.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Burkina Faso (3.8) 27.5 (1.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Moldova (7.7) 12.0 (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Gambia (2.9) 31.0 (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Laos (2.9) 24.0 (0.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Fiji (3.4) 20.0 (0.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Oman (4.0) 15.0 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Congo, Republic of (1.4) 35.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Uganda (1.7) 30.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Mali (2.0) 24.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Macedonia, F.Y.R. (4.8) 10.0 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Montenegro (1.5) 9.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Vanuatu (0.3) 34.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Togo (0.4) 24.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Ecuador (0.4) 22.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Cambodia (0.4) 20.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Saint-Martin, France (0.2) 34.5 (0.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Liechtenstein (0.2) 12.5 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
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All banks Namibia (0.0) 32.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Bahamas 20.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Bahrain (5.6) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Bermuda 80.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Cayman Islands 57.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Channel Islands 168.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Guernsey 78.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Isle of Man 131.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks New Caledonia 27.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks British Virgin Islands 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Kazakhstan 0.2 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Angola 0.2 30.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
All banks Falkland Islands 0.4 24.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
All banks Jordan 0.7 20.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
All banks Equatorial Guinea 1.1 24.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Cameroon 0.9 33.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Panama 1.2 25.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Paraguay 4.7 10.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Cyprus 4.0 12.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4
All banks Ivory Coast 2.0 25.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
All banks French Polynesia 2.3 24.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Guinea 2.5 24.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Seychelles 2.6 30.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
All banks Madagascar 4.3 20.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
All banks Pakistan 4.1 31.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Sierra Leone 4.3 30.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Kuwait 9.9 15.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Iraq 13.3 15.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Nepal 9.7 24.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Zambia 6.8 35.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0
All banks Maldives 9.9 24.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0
All banks Lebanon 19.8 15.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Lithuania 27.0 15.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 3.2
All banks Macao, China 36.5 12.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0
All banks Israel 20.1 23.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Qatar 52.2 10.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0
All banks Belarus 29.8 18.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 0.0
All banks China with HK 26.6 25.0 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Algeria 26.6 26.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 0.0
All banks Kenya 30.2 30.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0
All banks Latvia 48.8 20.0 0.0 9.8 0.0 5.4
All banks Uruguay 43.7 25.0 0.0 10.9 0.0 0.0
All banks Brazil 34.5 34.0 0.0 11.7 0.0 0.0
All banks Nigeria 41.1 30.0 0.0 12.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Ghana 54.0 25.0 0.0 13.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Gibraltar 162.1 10.0 0.0 16.2 0.0 0.0
All banks Singapore 138.4 17.0 0.0 23.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Colombia 71.4 34.0 0.0 24.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Estonia 129.7 20.0 0.0 25.9 0.0 18.2
All banks New Zealand 93.4 28.0 0.0 26.2 0.0 0.0
All banks Monaco 80.5 33.3 0.0 26.8 0.0 0.0
All banks Bangladesh 109.8 25.0 0.0 27.4 0.0 0.0
All banks Slovakia 137.8 21.0 0.0 28.9 0.0 27.6
All banks Mauritius 216.9 15.0 0.0 32.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Egypt 174.7 22.5 0.0 39.3 0.0 0.0
All banks Malta 115.0 35.0 0.0 40.3 0.0 18.4
All banks Portugal 132.2 31.5 0.0 41.6 0.0 23.8
All banks Turkey 237.5 22.0 0.0 52.2 0.0 0.0
All banks Canada 213.3 26.8 0.0 57.2 0.0 0.0
All banks Peru 223.0 29.5 0.0 65.8 0.0 0.0
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All banks Jersey 365.8 20.0 0.0 73.2 0.0 0.0
All banks United Arab Emirates 140.7 55.0 0.0 77.4 0.0 0.0
All banks Saudi Arabia 399.0 20.0 0.0 79.8 0.0 0.0
All banks Argentina 428.7 30.0 0.0 128.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Japan 436.0 29.7 0.0 129.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Australia 466.1 30.0 0.0 139.8 0.0 0.0
All banks Finland 809.1 20.0 0.0 161.8 0.0 97.1
All banks Czech Republic 950.6 19.0 0.0 180.6 0.0 142.6
All banks Chile 826.2 25.0 0.0 206.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Ireland 1,798.5 12.5 0.0 224.8 0.0 287.8
All banks Denmark 1,295.0 22.0 0.0 284.9 0.0 246.1
All banks China, P.R.: Mainland 1,278.7 25.0 0.0 319.7 0.0 0.0
All banks Norway 1,778.1 23.0 0.0 409.0 0.0 0.0
All banks Mexico 1,388.4 30.0 0.0 416.5 0.0 0.0
All banks Belgium 1,593.8 29.6 0.0 471.8 0.0 223.1
All banks Sweden 3,572.2 22.0 0.0 785.9 0.0 464.4
All banks Hong Kong, China 5,173.3 16.5 0.0 853.6 0.0 0.0
All banks Luxembourg 3,370.0 26.0 0.0 876.2 0.0 67.4
Total (0.0) (7,370.1) 6,473.9 (4,793.2) 1,625.3
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